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I want to suggest in this article some com-plexities in and around the idea that the 
child, in several recent discussions on reproduc-
tive technologies, is constantly brought in rela-
tion to the market and commodity, and yet is 
not simply equated with commodity. When and 
how is the child a commodity and not a com-
modity?
Polemics concerning the child as “commod-
ity” include many well-known books such as 
Naomi Wolf ’s Misconceptions.1 The concern of 
arguments such as those of Wolf is that the child 
be viewed as something more or other than a 
commodity. Wolf writes, for instance:
I couldn’t help but wonder why we could 
not see babies for themselves, rather than 
seeing them as extensions of ourselves, 
our lifestyle preferences, our heritages, 
our fantasies. I became scared by what 
appeared to be a distorted value system 
in which fetuses and newborns were mere 
commodities. And if they were commodi-
ties, who “owned” them?2
The commodity, and commodity-ownership, 
here is a diminishment of babies, who should be 
seen for “themselves”. This way of being seen is 
contrasted with being considered as “extensions 
[...] lifestyle preferences, our heritages, our fan-
tasies”, but at the same time is the result of Wolf 
claiming a double vision, both of how babies 
are seen, and how they should be seen. Babies 
are constituted in the present as “extensions 
of ourselves”, but are already also knowable as 
“themselves”, apart from “ourselves”, even if this 
is also projected as a vision of the future. Wolf 
continues:
I started to see eggs, fetuses, and babies 
as little coins, little chits used in a modern 
currency system; they had the meaning 
and value we assigned to them. Healthy 
or unhealthy? Mother’s or father’s? White 
or black? Related to you or unrelated? The 
baby’s value seemed to shift, to rise or fall 
accordingly. The economy was based on 
what adults longed for and needed. But 
what about the babies, I thought. What 
about what they needed? [...] What is 
lost in a market economy of “best” and 
“seconds”, in a society where babies are a 
form of currency, is the central paradox of 
true parenthood, which should be deﬁned 
as our absolute commitment to a creature 
of whom we can claim no rights of pos-
session. Is there any other relationship in 
which we have to love not for ourselves 
or the return on our investment, but for 
love’s own sake?3
There is a temporal reversal here. Where the 
child previously needed to be divested of a com-
modity status it already had, here it is introduced 
into that commodity economy. What can be 
noted, then, is that the child and parenthood 
are consistently deﬁned as inappropriate to “a 
modern currency system”, but also therefore 
deﬁned in relation to, or as already part of, this 
system. The babies are part of a “value system”, 
but it is “distorted” in terms of seeing them 
merely as commodities. Wolf can “start to see” 
babies “as little coins, little chits”, where the 
diminutive seems to merge, by qualifying jointly, 
money and babies. Nevertheless, this is what the 
babies are not to be, although they can be seen as 
such. Babies are not the coins of a modern cur-
rency system because “value” is something “we 
assigned”, but inappropriately. The assignment 
is done by “we” adults, in terms of our longings 
and needs. But babies have their own needs, are 
not to be owned by their parents as money is 
owned, and ought to be loved “for love’s own 
sake”.
As Sara Thornton notes of such views, “the 
child is seen as a sacred object, outside of the 
market…”4, and Viviana Zelizer suggests that 
“[after] the nineteenth century, the new norma-
tive ideal of the child as an exclusively emotional 
and aﬀective asset precluded instrumental and 
ﬁscal considerations. […] The economic and sen-
timental value of children were thereby declared 
to be radically incompatible”.5 Rachel Bowlby, 
in her discussion of reproductive technologies, 
childhood and consumerism in Shopping with 
Freud, further argues that
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What is interesting […] is that the 
attribution of consumerly qualities, unlike 
the attribution of a language of individual 
choice, is assumed to be automatically 
damning. […] This also […] has the eﬀect 
of implicitly separating the choice to have 
children into two classes, the pure and the 
impure. If some people want babies the 
way they want cars, then somewhere else 
there are genuine parents-to-be, whose 
desires, whether rational or natural, remain 
untainted. In neither case, the genuine or 
the consumerly, is the wish taken as requir-
ing any further analysis.6
Although it may be clear, then, what Wolf 
(and the many other similar writers) is pleading 
for on one level, the diﬃculty is to know exactly 
what this means, and how such recommenda-
tions are to be implemented. For Wolf ’s baby, 
on the one hand seen by Wolf from her perspec-
tives, is for her ultimately self-constituted, apart 
from adult deﬁnition or interpretation. It can 
be known as itself, in terms of itself, and – and 
although – these terms are in relation to, and part 
of, the terms of a certain contemporary money-
economy. The baby, then, declares itself as not a 
commodity, not merely to be owned or valued 
in monetary and property terms. This positions 
Wolf as a privileged viewer of the babies’ self-
hood, a privileged reader of that which, on the 
other hand, is self-declared by the baby. As such, 
babies are no longer owned and interpreted by 
Wolf, but can be seen by her through an unme-
diated, direct vision. This is “true” parenthood, 
but it is also a parenthood to which so many 
are blind, that Wolf must instruct others into 
it. Wolf is both part of the “we”, and outside of 
it. Wolf begins by also not being able to see the 
baby for itself, and becomes able to do so through 
her personal journey of conception, delivery, 
and child-raising, and she wishes to introduce 
others to this new or other vision. A paradoxical 
pedagogy of experience therefore operates here 
too, in that the having of a baby is at one and 
the same time the revelation of a unique and 
minority vision, and part of a universal experi-
ence of the having of children. We can see that 
this dual view of the having of children that we 
have already encountered before occurs here too: 
it is formulated as both unique and ubiquitous, 
highly personal and the ultimate shared experi-
ence. In these terms, the having of a baby is both 
an ultimately private act, a personal pursuit of 
a private aim, and the underpinning of a joint 
humanity. Wolf ’s narratives of family and friends 
who are alternately either in opposition to, or 
conﬁrming extensions of, her own experience, 
act out this oscillation between isolation and 
commonality.
Wolf ’s self-declaring baby, then, announces 
itself only to the few, who are true parents 
already. True parents and the true baby, who is 
neither property nor money, nor a production 
of adults, go together and recognise each other. 
Further, the baby which is not to be property, 
or necessarily related, or the mother’s or the 
father’s, or white or black, still has “parents”. 
This “parent” must be not an owner of the baby, 
nor necessarily related to it. A true parent, then, 
is no more than the perfect student of the true 
baby which it already knows in order to be such 
a true parent. This true baby known in and of 
itself – and the true parent deﬁned in relation to 
its ability to know such a baby – is self-evidently 
distinguishable from “our fantasies”. This baby, 
as I suggested before, is an aspect of a real which 
is known as the real, distinct from “unreal” things 
such as money, or value, or fantasies. It is reality 
itself, speaking itself, simultaneously self-evident, 
and yet known to only a few. Experience here is 
the access to the real, but experience, at the same 
time, can only be accessed in turn through non-
experience: texts about childbearing and raising 
in this case.
Wolf, and many other writers’ eﬀorts at sepa-
rating out of the child from a money economy or 
fantasy by identifying their real child are part of 
their eﬀorts to value equally all children or “any 
child”. But it is the already included acceptance 
of value that dogs their attempts in several ways. 
Even within their own discussions, children are 
already split into diﬀering kinds of children, 
some of whom are wanted, some of whom are 
not; some, therefore, valued (more), and some 
not (or less). The value which they attempt 
to ward oﬀ as appropriate only to money, not 
to the child, which is not to be a commod-
ity, or part of an economy, makes a troubling 
constant return. Just to begin with, Wolf ’s nar-
rative of her own pregnancy and delivery rests 
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on her acknowledged wish for an “own child”. 
Germaine Greer, for instance, similarly recounts 
her eﬀorts to conceive a child, conceding an 
inability to account for the wish for such a child, 
even when she forcefully condemns that “[o]ur 
world already manifests a dangerous degree of 
contrast between the fertile rich and the fecund 
poor”.7 As Rachel Bowlby argues: “the psycho-
logical and social conditions of consumer choice 
are anything but obvious: the problem is rather 
in the way that consumer choice can come to 
function rhetorically as a category taken as being 
both simple – in need of no more discussion 
– and negative, if not corrupt”.8
We can consider the problem of the value of 
the child further in relation to a rare instance 
where commodiﬁcation is seen as a positive 
process. Dion Farquhar argues that opposition 
to commodiﬁcation is based on a
[f ]undamentalist feminist contempt for 
the liberal market model [which] is para-
sitic on a fantasy of an unproblematized 
edenic pre-market unmediated maternal 
body. The market, in this view, sullies 
and cheapens an essentially true or real 
transcendent reproduction by abstracting 
its functions and dividing its elements for 
exchange and economic compensation. 
Donors are paid; body parts are alienated. 
This critique of commodiﬁcation is essen-
tially a softened-up version of the Marxian 
account of reiﬁcation. As such, it is not 
exhaustive, but quite one-sided. What 
such accounts miss entirely is the exhila-
ration and productivity – of identities, 
pleasures, and options – that are inherent 
in commodiﬁcation. “‘Commodiﬁcation’ 
of reproduction refers to the processes by 
which economic relationships of various 
kinds are introduced into the social pat-
terns of human reproduction”. The impli-
cation that before the development of 
reproductive technologies, reproduction 
[...] did not entail oppressive political and 
economic relationships of dependency and 
exploitation [...] is ludicrous. 9
One diﬃculty that arises from Farquhar’s 
points here is that the “exhilaration” seems to 
me a displacement from the “natural”, rather 
than a disruption of it. This rests on Farquhar’s 
acceptance of exhilaration as “inherent in com-
modiﬁcation”. This in turn seems to me to result 
from an equating of economy with proliferation, 
which, as I also argued earlier, is then valued 
as exhilaration and productivity. For me the 
problem lies in both the assumed equation, 
and the claimed inherence of such a valuation. 
Furthermore, Farquhar’s critique here of an 
opposition to the market relies on the assertion of 
the market as also having these positive aspects, 
rather than primarily on questioning further the 
way the market is involved in identity. Farquhar 
does propose that a true or real maternal body is 
produced in opposition to the market, but she 
then, in critiquing Christine Overall, does not 
further consider the construction of the market 
in its own terms, instead inserting that market, 
or economics, as having been always present 
anyway as oppressive political and economic 
relationships of dependency and exploitation. 
Motherhood and parenthood to her have there-
fore always been implicated in an economy. In 
terms of Farquhar’s prior positive evaluation of 
commodiﬁcation, it is a release from (“social and 
political”) oppression for women which diﬀer-
entiates her exhilarating commodiﬁcation from 
economies of dependency.
Farquhar’s argument, in formulating identi-
ties (gender, in this case) as involved in economic 
relationships, does not clarify how any identity 
could necessarily be read as economic or not 
economic. If economies have always, to her, 
mediated reproduction, primarily in terms of 
oppressive gender relationships, then this still 
does not address how women or children, for 
instance, are themselves seen as commodities. 
Re-inserting economy into the past can only 
further conﬁrm that babies have always been 
commodities. I can assume either that Farquhar 
intends such a status as commodity to be the 
product of oppression, or that this commodity-
baby has also always been part of the exhilara-
tion of commodiﬁcation. In the ﬁrst case, this 
surely re-instates commodiﬁcation as a problem, 
a production of oppression. But this would re-
instate a true or real identity beyond the status 
of commodity that Farquhar rejects, at least with 
respect to the maternal body.
Metaphor is often brought in to discussions 
as the perceived mediating connection between 
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identities and economies. Janelle Taylor, for 
instance, argues that;
One reason, perhaps, that these two 
streams [consumption and motherhood 
and reproduction] have tended to run 
in parallel is that the body metaphors of 
eating and digesting food remain implicit 
in theories of consumption, which mix 
rather badly with the metaphorical asso-
ciations of procreation, making it diﬃcult 
[...] to bring theories of consumption to 
bear speciﬁcally upon motherhood. [...] 
This metaphor [of eating] shapes – and, I 
would argue, hinders – our understanding 
[of pregnancy and motherhood].10
But I would suggest such deployments of 
metaphor, as with Farquhar, raise the ques-
tions: what does it mean to say that an identity 
is either like an economy, or that it is (part of ) 
an economy? Note, for instance, Zelizer’s deﬁni-
tion of the child as an “emotional and aﬀective 
asset” in the midst of a formulation attempting 
to diagnose the extrapolation of the child from 
an economy of the “instrumental or ﬁscal”.11 I 
read this problem as an ongoing determinant of 
arguments in Taylor’s further discussion when 
she would seem, interestingly, simultaneously to 
be rejecting (or avoiding) and restating Freud’s12 
theories of the wish for the child when she con-
tinues further by asserting that;
The fetus … may … “satisfy human 
wants of some sort or another”, [but] it is 
diﬃcult to imagine these wants as “spring-
ing from the stomach”. This makes it 
rather diﬃcult to conceptualize pregnancy, 
and by extension motherhood, in terms 
of consumption. How can the bearing 
of children be likened to the ingestion of 
food? The very suggestion seems to invoke 
that most frightening of all monsters, the 
mother who eats her own children.13
Taylor therefore attributes her ﬁeld’s (anthro-
pology) “ideological opposition”14 of two topics 
(consumption and motherhood) to its diﬃculty 
in conceptualizing or likening motherhood to 
consumption, although she then promptly does 
so conceptualize motherhood, as, moreover, “that 
most frightening of all monsters, the mother 
who eats her own children”. In other words, I 
can read “metaphor” here – even, or especially, 
in Taylor’s own formulations – not as a source 
of the separation of motherhood and consump-
tion because they “mix rather badly”15 with one 
another, but as a source of separation because 
they mix rather too well. Indeed, the very formu-
lation of “ideological opposition” itself suggests 
this: as a warding oﬀ, as a keeping separate of 
that which belongs or belonged together and 
threatens to re-merge. Or, to put it diﬀerently, 
and in line with my overall arguments here, the 
question is what constitutes “metaphor” when it 
can be read itself as the very reality it is supposed 
to have only an indirect, derivative, or second-
ary, relation to? At stake in this discussion, again, 
are ideas of relationship, simultaneously in terms 
of ideas of “economies” (markets, consumption) 
and the child and/or mother as being “related”, 
and ideas of kinds or levels of languages and the 
real as being related, or about relationship. As 
Taylor herself writes;
Scholars of consumption [...] have given 
the topic of motherhood comparatively 
little consideration. One reason for this, 
perhaps, is that consumption studies have 
tended to be cast as studies of “material 
culture”, exploring the social and cultural 
role of material objects – while motherhood 
is understood to be a relationship between 
persons. The dividing line separating 
people from objects would seem, in this 
perspective, to be quite clearly bounded, 
ﬁxed, and stable: the question is merely 
how they aﬀect one another. The task of 
the analyst, then, becomes one of speci-
fying relationships. Reproductive tech-
nologies and the controversies that swirl 
around them clearly suggest, however, that 
such distinctions – between persons and 
objects, bodies and commodities, mothers 
and consumers – are not so clear-cut.16
Relationships, it would seem, are ready to 
collapse, or be collapsed, in on themselves. It is 
notable, however, that in Taylor’s argument the 
fetus (amongst other things), after all, is reconsti-
tuted as outside of metaphor, as must inevitably 
occur in terms of metaphor’s own relationship 
with non-metaphor; “the consumer of social 
theory inhabits a body that, if not necessarily 
male [...] is at least not as easily imagined as a 
speciﬁcally pregnant body. The fetus is emphati-
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cally not ‘an object outside us’”.17 This seems to 
situate the fetus as, inevitably, in a “biological” 
sense, “within” the body, while it may be (and 
has been) read in several ways as either not part 
of a (maternal) body – as a autonomous “object” 
or “subject” – or not “within” a body.18
The reaﬃrmation of relationship as, then, after 
all, a necessary mediation preventing uniﬁcation 
is conﬁrmed, moreover, as in many writings, by 
Taylor’s perceptions of the limitations of theory;
The relationship between motherhood 
and consumption is, however, far more 
than merely a theoretical question – it is 
a vital matter with which ordinary people 
struggle on a daily basis: What must I (and 
what can I) do and have and buy in order 
to properly love, value, educate, nurture, 
provide for, raise – in a word, mother my 
child(ren)? Consuming Motherhood takes 
this up through ethnographic and histori-
cal explorations of how ordinary women, 
striving to build and maintain relations of 
kinship in the context of globalizing con-
sumer capitalism, live out motherhood in 
and through, as well as against, ideologies 
and practices of consumption.19
The split (re)introduced by metaphor is here 
elaborated as the split between the theoretical 
and the vital, ordinary, and daily, where moth-
erhood is apart from consumption, whether 
positively or negatively: “mere” theory against, 
or apart from, life as it is “lived out”.
Farquhar’s argument too seems to me to leave 
this kind of a question unresolved. It is relevant 
in this respect that her section on these issues is 
entitled “Demonology of the Consumer and the 
Market”. This conﬁrms certain understandings 
of these terms (as with Janelle Taylor’s formula-
tions), while critiquing an enmity towards them. 
Where a possibility is introduced of questioning 
what and how commodities and markets are 
constructed in relation to, or as, motherhood, 
reproduction, and the child, Farquhar’s argument 
halts at conﬁrming the market and economics as 
positive proliferation, as long as the woman is 
free to choose (how) to consume. As Farquhar 
quotes Michelle Stanworth approvingly in con-
clusion;
it is not technology as an “artiﬁcial inva-
sion of the human body” that is at issue 
– but whether we can create the political 
and cultural conditions in which such 
technologies can be employed by women 
to shape the experience of reproduction 
according to their own deﬁnitions.20
Much as I sympathise with the critiques that 
Farquhar and Stanworth are making of a polar-
ity between a “natural” and a “technological”, in 
which either one or the other is privileged, an 
approval of the market as a liberal, non-oppres-
sive mechanism where women can freely choose 
their deﬁnitions of reproduction seems to me 
problematic in the ways that I have noted previ-
ously.
Jacqueline Rose illuminates several aspects of 
the complexities of the child and commodity in 
her discussion, in The Case of Peter Pan21, of chil-
dren’s literature as a ﬁeld which deﬁnes the child 
as knowable for its own purposes. The child in 
children’s literature, Rose argues, is assumed as 
an autonomous reality, in that it is to be known 
as the appropriate recipient of a book to which it 
is equated. The child as the book reads itself, and 
this is seen to constitute the ultimate in education 
without force. A disinterested and “noble” altru-
ism is upheld here too, with the adult knowing 
the child in the child’s best interests and on its 
own behalf. Rose instead reads the adult as that 
which creates the child: in producing children’s 
literature, it produces the child for that literature 
as well as in the literature. Rose suggests further 
that “in the case of children’s ﬁction, this rela-
tionship between the business of the trade on the 
one hand, and the self-generating body of the 
innocent child on the other, is of an essential, 
rather than a contingent nature”.22 For Rose, the 
relationship of the commercial value of children’s 
books and the value of the child is one suppressed 
in the service of
a wholly generalised concept of culture 
which cannot see the divisions on which 
it rests. The aestheticisation, the gloriﬁca-
tion, the valuing of the child [...] act as 
a kind of cover for these diﬀerences [...] 
If we look at the children’s book market, 
its identity falls apart, exposing the gaps 
between producer (writer), distributor 
(book-seller or publisher), purchaser 
(parents, friends and/or children) and 
the consumer (ideally, but only ideally, 
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the child). These spaces, missed meeting 
points, places of imposition, exploitation 
(or even gloriﬁcation of the child) are not 
entirely diﬀerent in kind from those which 
characterise other aspects of the literary 
life of our culture. They are not exclusive 
to the world of children’s books.23
Nor, I would add (as Rose herself also does 
later), are they exclusive to the literary life of 
our culture, even if the gaps might be located 
between slightly shifted locations. Where Rose 
notes how the child in children’s literature serves 
to gloss over diﬀering values in terms of class 
and literacy, the child in reproductive technolo-
gies, I am arguing, serves to gloss over diﬀering 
valuations according to ideas of the own and 
not-own, which in turn are manifested in a 
variety of ways, as we will continue to explore. 
The warding-oﬀ of the market through the 
child which is to be exclusively self-constituted 
as a reality apart from, or in opposition to, a 
symbolic or fantastic currency, ﬁxes the child as 
existing in and of itself for itself. In this respect, 
the market is established as paradoxically con-
stituent of, and inherent to, culture and society, 
and at the same time as marking, in those cases, 
a suspect encroachment on, or degradation of, a 
purer private life, demarcated by the family and 
the sphere of emotions. As Rose adds,
[Peter Pan’s] material success [...] and 
corresponding status [...] say something 
about the fantasies which our culture con-
tinues to perpetuate – about its own worth, 
its future and its traditions – through the 
child[;] [...] the whole question [...] of 
what – in general – can survive, of what 
is endurance, perpetuity, and eternal 
worth.24
The wish for the child, and the child that is 
wished for, are called up as guarantors of the 
eternal and endurance of repetition: true re/pro-
duction, undiluted or contaminated by other 
interests or investments. The credit is to belong 
wholly to the child. In this way, the parent is 
released, from property ownership, and is simul-
taneously retrieved dialectically as merely the 
servant of the child. And this all is to be due to 
the child.25 As Rose concludes,
Freud’s theory of the unconscious is a 
challenge above all to just this sameness in 
that it undermines the idea that psychic 
life is continuous, that language can give 
us mastery, or that past and future can be 
cohered into a straightforward sequence, 
and controlled. Above all it throws into 
question the idea that the child can be 
placed at the beginnings of this process 
(origins of culture, before sexuality and 
the word), or, indeed, at the end (the guar-
antee of a continuity for ourselves and our 
culture over time).
I also understand this problem of the child 
as both commodity and not-commodity to be 
parallel to, or part of, the argument by Judith 
Butler, in her consideration of kinship, Antigone’s 
Claim: Kinship Between Life and Death, that
[t]he Hegelian legacy of Antigone inter-
pretation appears to assume the separabil-
ity of kinship and the state, even as it posits 
an essential relation between them. And so 
every interpretive eﬀort to cast a character 
as representative of kinship or the state 
tends to falter and lose coherence and 
stability. This faltering has consequences 
not only for the eﬀort to determine the 
representative function of any character 
but for the eﬀort to think the relationship 
between kinship and the state [...] For two 
questions that the play poses are whether 
there can be kinship – and by kinship I 
do not mean the “family” in any speciﬁc 
form – without the support and media-
tion of the state, and whether there can be 
the state without the family as its support 
and mediation. And further, when kinship 
comes to pose a threat to state authority 
and the state sets itself in a violent strug-
gle against kinship, can these very terms 
sustain their independence from one 
another?26
For “state” read also “market”, and, in terms 
of “character”, read also: child. Butler is here 
questioning these terms as autonomous and 
separable entitities, caught up in a politics of 
representation which presupposes language as a 
transparent conveyor of prior “images”, “struc-
tures” or “objects”. Further, the possibility of 
relationship is at stake. What is read as legitimized 
and legitimating relationship, or what constitutes 
relationship at all? Legitimation is dependent on 
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authority, but here unstably constituted as the 
state or family, or family as through the state 
and the state as through family. Butler suggests 
that “although Hegel claims that [Antigone’s] 
deed is opposed to Creon’s, the two acts mirror 
rather than oppose one another, suggesting that 
if the one represents kinship and the other the 
state, they can perform this representation only 
by each becoming implicated in the idiom of the 
other”.27
Or as Rose concludes:
For Peter Pan has appeared not just as a 
part of history, but equally it has served as 
a response to history, [...] No divisions of 
culture and literacy (the cry of a literature 
asserting its freedom from the world), no 
impingement on the family by the state 
(the reaction of the state to its earlier poli-
cies), no diﬀerences ﬁnally between chil-
dren (the same the world over – no class 
barriers here). Instead the eternal child.28
Linked further to this, Butler suggests that 
there is a possible reading of Antigone “in which 
she exposes the socially contingent character of 
kinship, only to become the repeated occasion 
in the critical literature for a rewriting of that 
contingency as immutable necessity”.29
Thus I read Rose’s child and Butler’s Antigone 
as the occasion of a parallel critical practice, with 
parallel aims and ends. Speciﬁcally, in this context, 
the own child of reproductive technologies is to 
shore up a division between – or rather, a divid-
ability of – the state and the family, and kinship 
and the state, at the same time as it establishes 
the mutual implicatedness of the state (and the 
market) and reproduction, family, and kinship. 
In doing so, the child underpins, through and as 
the family, gender, heterosexuality, and national-
ity. The “right” child is the child of the Western 
market, even, and because, it is not itself only or 
simply a commodity. Or, to put it diﬀerently, it 
is precisely a condition of this market that there 
is a non-market which is implicated in it, and in 
which it is implicated. I do not think it is coinci-
dental, then, that Butler’s text echoes a phrase of 
Rose’s from the quotation above, when she notes 
in her discussion of Hegel’s reading of Antigone 
that the “public sphere, as I am calling it here, is 
called variably the community, government, and 
the state by Hegel; it only acquires its existence 
through interfering with the happiness of the 
family”.30
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